

INTEGRAL SEX COMPLEMENTARITY

Draft Version

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Introduction

Philosophers can make an important contribution to contemporary discussions about sex identity by uncovering the fundamental theories of sex identity that these discussions presuppose. While contemporary thought explodes with apparently multiple theories about woman's or man's respective identities there are, nonetheless, a limited number of fundamental structures common to these theories. In this paper I will delineate and describe these fundamental structures of theories of sex identity.

It is important to understand the philosophical reasons for my choice of the phrase "sex identity" to identify the subject for investigation, rather than the phrase "gender identity." The word gender, which historically was used to refer to a classification of words as masculine, feminine, or neuter, had recently been frequently used to include a wide range of characteristics of the delineation of woman and man. It has even been argued that it is the best term for considerations of questions of sex identity because of the fact that it includes woman and man in an equal reference. However, to focus on sex identity from the perspective of gender is to place it outside the activity of an individual self defining himself or herself as man or woman. Gender implies an external object being delineated. Sex identity, on the other hand, implies an existential activity of self definition as man or woman. For this reason I choose to focus on the philosophy of sex identity.

The key reference points in philosophical structures of sex identity are the two issues of differentiation and equality. More specifically, each theory

sets out to determine whether differences between men and women are philosophically significant, and/or whether one sex is equal in dignity and worth to the other sex. By considering responses to these questions the structure of three main theories of sex identity can be delineated as follows:

	<u>differentiation</u>	<u>equality</u>
<u>sex unity</u>	no	yes
<u>sex polarity</u>	yes	no
<u>sex complementarity</u>	yes	yes

In the above chart sex unity, sex polarity, and sex complementarity are described as if they were philosophers giving answers to questions. This anthropomorphism of theories of sex identity is a heuristic device that is used throughout this paper to simplify the lines of argument. While philosophers are identified as arguing along the lines of sex unity, sex polarity, or sex complementarity, no effort is made to prove this assertion here. That particular task I am devoting to a series of books the first of which has been published as The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution (750BC-1250 AD) (Montreal and London: Eden Press, 1985). There is also an appendix attached to this paper which lists in alphabetical order all philosophers mentioned in the paper, with a bibliographical reference to at least one of their works, and with a short passage in which their view of sex identity is stated.

Sex unity, sex polarity, and sex complementarity, then, are identified as the three main theories delineated by different responses to questions about equality and differentiation. Of course, at this moment in the delineation,

the theories are left general and all encompassing. What it means to argue that one sex is superior in dignity and worth to the other, or that men and women are equal in dignity and worth, or that some differences between them are philosophically significant ---what these questions mean is being left open to let the barest outline of the structures become visible. This preliminary illumination of the structures of theories of sex identity is simply one of the first steps that a philosophical analysis can take.

Once structures have been identified as underlying a particular theory of sex identity, then the variations within a structure can be further explicated. For example, it will be seen that there are two different versions of sex polarity, traditional sex polarity in which it is argued that men are by nature superior to women, and reverse sex polarity in which it is argued that women are by nature superior to men. Once again just the bare outline of the structure is being delineated here. The specific way in which a theorist argues that one sex is superior to the other is not yet being examined.

Another example of a variation of fundamental structure is seen in the differentiation of a fractional sex complementarity from an integral sex complementarity. In the former it is argued that a man and a woman are like numerical fractions in relation to one another, whereas in the latter it is argued that they are in relationship analogous with numerical integers. One of the purposes of this paper will be to provide a solid philosophical defence for integral sex complementarity which claims that there are philosophically significant differences between men and women, that neither sex is fundamentally superior in dignity and worth to the other, and that men and women ought to be thought of as more like integers than as fractions in relation with one another.

I have argued elsewhere that the fundamental theory of sex unity also has a variation which can be called sex neutrality. However, this variation is different from the two previously mentioned ones in that it does not constitute a direct argument about sex identity. Instead sex neutrality simply ignores issues about sex identity because of a presupposition that they are not of significance to the field. Obviously mathematics contains a sex neutrality perspective, as does logic. Indeed it is the role of logic in philosophical discussions that for the most part carved out a sex neutrality perspective in which simply the generic category 'human being' sufficed as a subject. In this view sexual differentiation was considered to be outside the range of philosophical reflection. Therefore, sex neutrality is an indirect rather than direct theory of sex identity. In fact it is more of an orientation of exclusion of theories of sex identity rather than a theory of sex identity proper. Therefore even though sex neutrality is identified here as being a kind of variation of sex unity it can also contain a hidden theory of sex polarity, sex unity, or sex complementarity.

Another important activity that philosophers can engage in with respect to the above delineated structures of theories of sex identity is to trace the variety of ways in which these theories have been historically articulated. Sex unity, polarity, and complementarity have each had long histories which reach back to ancient Greek philosophy. Leaving aside the question of whether this structural repetition is chronological, epochal, or linear, in this paper the historical similarity of structures will be elaborated. The fundamental questions about sex identity were raised by the pre-Socratic philosophers who asked 1) in what sense are male and female opposite or the same?; 2) how does the contribution of the mother and father in generation relate to sex

identity?; 3)are women and men wise in the same or different ways?; and 4) do women and men have the same or different virtues? These four questions can be seen as delineating the four categories of sex identity: namely, **opposites**, **generation**, **wisdom**, and **virtue**. The answers to these questions which philosophers elaborated during ensuing centuries provided the context in which the specific theories of sex unity, polarity, and complementarity emerged.

In this paper an overview will be given of the historical development of the three above identified theories of sex identity with their variations. Wherever possible an association between the historical line of argumentation will be made with some contemporary discussions of similar issues. In this way the similarity of the structure will be evident as well as the new formulations of the structure within a different historical period. The goal of tracing the historical developments of the theories of sex identity in this paper, however, will be to establish the context for the articulation of a contemporary theory of integral sex complementarity as the theory which best accounts for the respective identities of man and woman.

The methodology which will be used is philosophical in that it limits itself to the exercise of reason and the observation of the senses. It does not appeal to faith or religious authority per se to defend its theories, or incorporate statistical data to support its claims, or analyze collective forces or motives to explain events. In this way a philosophical method is differentiated from that found in theology, sociology, history, or other fields. The data to be used are original texts written by men or women about sex identity,--- texts which elaborate philosophical arguments as described above. Each theory of sex unity, sex polarity, and sex complementarity will be examined in turn.

SEX UNITY

History

Sex unity is often given the familiar appellation 'unisex' and it is found in documents ranging from the most sophisticated arguments in law to cultural phenomena associated with hair styles and clothes. In summary, sex unity can be characterized as the theory that defends the argument that there are no philosophically significant differences between the sexes, and for the purposes of this paper here, they can be described as concluding that man and woman are equal in dignity and worth.

Historically, the two most influential philosophers who provided a rationale for the theory of sex unity were Plato and Descartes. While their metaphysical starting point was different in that Plato focused on the soul in general while Descartes focused on the higher part of the rational soul, or the mind, the consequence of their theories for the philosophy of sex identity was similar. Both theories contained a devaluation of the body, and a claim that the proper place for the seat of personal identity was the soul or mind separate from the body. Since the soul or mind were considered as sexless entities for Plato or Descartes, it followed that personal identity did not necessarily carry a reference to sex identity, and bodily differences between women and men were not philosophically significant.

One important difference between the Platonic and Cartesian theories was that Plato argued directly in some of his dialogues, namely, the Republic and Laws for a sex unity theory, while Descartes simply took a sex neutrality stand and disregarded sexual differentiation. Another difference was that

Plato assumed as a metaphysical starting point of the soul the locus of individual human identity as capable of reincarnation in either a male or female body, while Descartes remained more interested simply in the mind as it functioned here and now without reference to the body.

Plato defended sex unity directly, that is he argued specifically that differences between men and women were not philosophically significant and that therefore they were equal in dignity and worth. In contrast to this, Descartes indirectly assumed a sex neutrality stance, that is he did not argue directly about men and women but assumed that differences between them were not philosophically significant. However, even with this difference, the effect of Plato's and Descartes' theories were historically similar. Namely, neo-Platonists and Cartesians used their master's theories to argue for a philosophy of sex unity. For example, the neo-Platonic philosopher Porphyry wrote a letter to Marcella in which he stated that she ought to identify with her sexless soul and not think of herself as female when being a philosopher. Similarly the Cartesian philosopher Poullain de la Barre argued that the similar nature of spirit, mind, and brain in women and in men provided the basis for their equality.

A further indication of the effect of a Cartesian sex neutrality on historical arguments for sex unity is found in the writings of Maria von Schurman, Mary Astell, or Mary Wollstonecraft. Throughout their works the discovery of the role of reason in human identity, and the common presence of a similar faculty of reason in men and women, led to a philosophical foundation for a new theory of sex unity. The bodily differences in the sexes were irrelevant to philosophy, they claimed, because reason was the same in both sexes, and the role of philosophy was to develop through education and

opportunity the mature exercise of reason. Consequently any differences between the sexes was not a basis for arguing that one sex was superior in dignity and worth to the other.

These arguments for sex unity in modern philosophy were not always consistent, and there were often strands of sex polarity or fractional sex complementarity woven in the Cartesian unisex tapestry. It has not really been until the second half of the twentieth century that a consistent rationale for sex unity has been articulated in philosophy. Sometimes it is formulated as an androgynous ideal of a world in which sex will not matter in any context, at other times it is posited as a value which an individual ought to choose, and still again as a recommended attitude of indifference towards sex as towards colour, national inheritance, or language.

Contemporary Context

The kind of arguments that are put forward in contemporary philosophy to defend the sex unity position appear for example in debates against preferential hiring, against reverse discrimination, or for equity in working conditions and payment when the basis for the position is the claim that there are no philosophically significant differences among human beings that can be derived from gender and, therefore, there ought to be no sexual differentiation in the place of work. The direct claim of this view is that sex identity is irrelevant to the issue at hand. The indirect assumption is that the body is an irrelevant aspect of personal identity.

In its extreme form sex unity theorists actually work to omit any aspect of sex identity which might become a basis for sexual differentiation. In these theorists the indirect devaluation of the body referred to above becomes

explicit. For example, Hilda Smith made the claim that a woman ought not to breast feed her child because it would give the child a different experience of the mother than of the father. Shulamith Firestone argued that women will only be able to be equal to men when all babies are developed outside the uterus, or in technical incubators.

The above aim of sex unity theories would be to get rid of the male/female distinction in so far as it has a reference to generation. Another example of this can be found in the fallacious argument that pregnancy and cancer ought both to be classified as diseases in health insurance policies and unemployment benefits in order not to have any privileged categories for women in health benefits or pay for time off work. The distortion of pregnancy into a female "disease", to make it fit in the same category as a male disease such as prostate cancer demonstrates the lengths to which the sex unity theorist will go to achieve its aim of getting rid of all sex distinctions. Obviously this distortion in order to fill the demand of equality completely ignores the difference between the two bodily states of pregnancy and disease, and thus it provides another example of the way in which sex unity theorists ignore the body.

In the realm of the masculine/feminine range of distinctions sex unity theorists tend to view masculinity and femininity on a unilinear scale which ranges within a particular culture from qualities that are called masculine on one end, to those called feminine on another. They often point out the relativity of these qualities cross culturally, and imply that there is an arbitrariness to their identification with one sex or another. In an early article on sex equality Alison Jaggar stated that the androgynous ideal which is proposed is one in which an individual can select whatever qualities 'they'

(a sex neutral word for 'he or she') prefer. Her hope then, which was modified in a later article, was that all reference to culturally differentiated masculine or feminine qualities would disappear.

For the extremist sex unity theorist the task of struggling for an authentic identity demands the exercise of the will to work towards getting rid of sexual differentiation biologically, psychically, economically, religiously, and so forth. Ultimately the designation man or woman would be replaced by sex neutral terms such as 'individual', 'person', 'human being', and so forth. Shulamith Firestone concludes that in an ideal society childbearing will be taken over by technology and all sex distinctions will disappear.

SEX POLARITY

History

The theory that claims that differences between man and woman are philosophically significant and that one sex is superior in dignity and worth to the other has been well supported in the history of philosophy. Aristotle was the first to develop a systematic defence of the theory in its traditional form which holds that man is by nature superior to woman. The basic structure of the sex polarity theory often selects one particular biological aspect of human identity, makes a claim that this aspect accounts for the superiority or inferiority of one or the other sex, and then derives other dynamics of the theory from this primary aspect. Aristotle chose as his biological starting point a claim that hot was superior to cold in the category of opposites, and that the male was by nature hotter than the female.

From the premise of the association of heat and cold with male and female Aristotle developed a wide ranging hypothesis about the relative superiority of man over woman. The greater heat of the male enabled him to produce fertile seed in generation; seed which in turn perfectly formed the matter produced by the mother generated a male child that resembled the father. All other combinations of children were an imperfect derivations from the perfect conception of the male who resembled the father, to the male who resembled the mother, the female who resembled the father, and finally with the female who resembled the mother at the lowest point of the scale. With the conception of the female being considered the result of a defective formation it is not surprising that Aristotle concluded that woman's reason was not as well formed as man's, and that subsequently her virtue would be to obey and not rule, to be silent and not speak, to act in the private and not public sphere, and to participate as the inferior partner in the virtue of friendship with a man. In sum, Aristotle's philosophical defense of sex polarity covered all four categories of the pre-Socratics: opposites, generation, wisdom, and virtue.

This Aristotelian structure for sex polarity was repeated with only slight variations by Maimonides, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome. Indeed it became the dominant theory of sex identity beginning with the four faculties of thirteenth century University of Paris and extending throughout western Europe. In this way the philosophy of sex polarity formed the basic structure of the graduate faculties of Medicine, Law, Theology as well as the undergraduate faculty of arts.

However, a thread of sex neutrality was woven into the tapestry of sex polarity in the Faculty of Arts through the incorporation of Aristotelian logic which focused on the consideration of species without regard to sexual

differentiation when considering human identity. In this way sex polarity and sex neutrality functioned together in the academic teaching of philosophy: in the context of logic, sexual differentiation was ignored, while in the context of ethics, metaphysics, politics, and philosophy of nature sex polarity was defended.

New forms of traditional sex polarity did not appear until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when philosophers sought for a new basis for the differentiation of man and woman. The prima facie emphasis shifted from the body to a consideration of the qualities of mind. Woman was described as more tied to the particular, to the present, to the emotions, to the private, to issues around taste, and beauty; while man was described as more tied to the universal, to the future, to discursive reason, to the public, to issues around ethics and nobility. The philosophers Rousseau, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hegel, and Kierkegaard each developed a rationale for sex polarity which ostensibly considered an aspect of the mind, but in all cases the mental qualities of woman were seen to derive from her biological nature as child bearer and child rearer. In a similar way the theory of man focused on his definition away from this biological realm of woman. While there were occasional attempts to imply that the difference is one of complementarity rather than polarity, careful reading of the texts reveal that man is considered to be superior in nature and dignity than woman. Therefore, these versions of sex polarity share the same pattern as Aristotelian sex polarity although there is a variation in expression of this pattern.

In other nineteenth century writers the biological focus of the fundamental premise of sex polarity was even more evident. Freud, for example selected the anatomy as the primary defining aspect of sex identity, he valued the male

anatomy over the female, and he concluded that the female was driven by an envy of the male in her own struggle for authentic identity. In a similar way Marx focused on the more positive dynamic of man as defined by his role in production, while the woman being outside of the realm of production, had an even inferior source of definition. In the case of Marx the interweaving thread was sex unity rather than complementarity, but the fundamental conception of the relative identities of man and woman was within the sex polarity model.

Contemporary Context

In contemporary theory traditional sex polarity still appears, although its support is considerably weakened. Jean Paul Sartre identifies woman with the in-itself and man with the for-itself because of their respective genital anatomy. DeBeauvoir follows Sartre's devaluation of woman but she focuses instead on the role of pregnancy in woman's relation with immanence and man's freedom from pregnancy in his relation with transcendence. Both theories reveal a sex polarity in their positive valuation of the for-itself and transcendence over and against the in-itself and immanence.

As research into the biological differentiation of man and woman becomes more sophisticated the Aristotelian identification of the opposites hot and cold have been replaced by a consideration of anatomy, hormones, or chromosomes. For example, Tiger argues that the male is and will always be superior to the female because of his genetic programming and evolutionary history. Tiger identifies cooperative hunting as the cause of bonding among men, a bond which still today builds man to man relationships in society. Others may argue that the xy chromosomal structure is superior to the xx

because of its greater complexity, and so forth. The key to these sex polarity arguments is the claim that sexual differentiation between man and woman is philosophically significant, and that a specific aspect of this differentiation is central to the valuation of man as superior to woman.

Reverse Sex Polarity

The first theorist to defend the opposite kind of polarity, or the superiority of woman over man was Agrippa who used theological arguments in the fourteenth century to defend the claim that since woman was the last in the order of creation, and the order was in increasing levels of perfection, that woman was superior to man. This served as a kind of counter argument to previous theological arguments in support of sex polarity which claimed that since woman came from the side of man she was inferior to man. Even though the conclusions were opposite, the structure of the premise was the same. Namely a single aspect of the biological nature was chosen and identified as the most significant aspect of the identity, and one sex was given a more positive relation to that aspect.

As philosophy progressed, other forms of this argument emerged. Woman, as described by Montague, is superior because of the greater strength of the xx chromosome and her bodily strength due to her capacity to give birth. Today in radical feminism there are many versions of reverse sex polarity. Some focus on a specific biological aspect of sex identity. Solanis identifies the xx chromosome as more stable and therefore superior to the xy chromosome. Others may select a cultural characteristic which was derived from a socio-biological dynamic of male or female identity. For example, Daly claims that a pseudo-genetic programming of the phallus is the cause of the inferiority of

men while the similar relation of woman to the elements is the cause of a natural superiority of woman. Several authors identify the socialization of woman as 'more caring' as superior to men, or they praise the practical mind of woman as superior to the abstract mind of men, and so forth. Usually these capacities are described as flowing from the natural relation of woman to the family and an emphasis on the realm of interpersonal relationships. In some post-structuralist writings this is sometimes translated into the superiority of a female culture.

In its most extreme form reverse sex polarity argues that men have so contaminated society historically that women ought to withdraw from relationship with them. More recently this view has stated that the goal for woman is to become 'woman identified'. Here reverse sex polarity has as its stated purpose the rendering invisible of the devalued male sex, in a similar way as traditional sex polarity, in its extreme form, also rendered invisible the existence of the devalued female sex.

SEX COMPLEMENTARITY

History

The earliest philosopher who suggested a theory of sex complementarity was probably Empedocles who argued that the mother and father both provided 1/2 of the seed necessary for the generation of a child. In his fragmentary account, the fundamental premises of sex complementarity were suggested, namely that there are philosophically significant differences between men and women and that neither sex is superior in dignity and worth over the other.

Augustine, the next theorist to suggest sex complementarity, approached the

topic only from a theological perspective. He argued that the resurrection of the body demanded a differentiation of man and woman that was permanent among the individuals who were equal in that state by virtue of their sanctity. Augustine also had support for sex unity and sex polarity in his philosophical approach to human identity. It was not until Hildegard of Bingen that a thorough philosophical basis for sex complementarity was articulated. Drawing upon medieval scientific assumptions about the elements and humors, Hildegard argued in all four categories of opposites, generation, wisdom, and virtue that man and woman were significantly different, and that neither sex was superior in dignity and worth to the other.

Historically the theory of sex complementarity never achieved the wide acceptance as did traditional sex polarity. Aristotelian rationale for this view dominated western consciousness so that by the end of the thirteenth century what could be called 'the Aristotelian Revolution in the philosophy of sex identity' occurred, and sex complementarity along with sex unity were defeated as alternative theories. The consequence of this revolution was that outside of areas influenced by Aristotelian logic in which sex neutrality pervaded, Aristotelian rationale for sex polarity provided the fundamental framework for understanding the respective identities of man and woman.

With the development of Italian Renaissance humanism in the 14th and 15th centuries a new formulation of sex complementarity began to emerge. Women and men were described as significantly different and equal particularly in the category of wisdom, and less so in the category of virtue. Boccaccio, Nogarola, Castiglioni, Ebrea, and others began to include female disputants in their philosophical dialogues. The influence of the Italians spread to France and triggered a similar awakening of sex complementarity in writers

such as Christine de Pisan, to Germany and the work of Eyb, to the Spanish philosopher Vives, or the English writer More. Sex complementarity began to be practiced and developed as a genuine philosophy of sex identity. It is not surprising that these philosophers also attacked Aristotelian philosophy to undermine that particular philosophical basis for sex polarity and sex neutrality.

It was during this period also that a noticeable shift in focus occurred in discussions of sex identity. Previously the main preoccupation had been with the starting point of male and female, as the biological locus of discussions about sex identity. With humanism the focus turned to a consideration of masculine and feminine. Here for the first time a generalized interest in what could be called the 'psychic depth' of sexual identity was considered. Often discussions considered the negative dynamics of femininity in a man or the positive dynamics of femininity in a woman, which revealed a hidden sex polarity underneath the surface of complementarity. However, the deeper insight that there was more to sex identity than simply the biological focus point of male and female identity was becoming generally confirmed.

With the seventeenth century emergence of Cartesianism a similar fate awaited the fragile new beginnings of a philosophy of sex complementarity as had happened previously with the Aristotelian revolution. This time sex unity along with a new mathematical rationale for sex neutrality followed along with what could be called the 'Cartesian Reformation in the philosophy of sex identity.' The consequence of this reformation was that discussions about sex identity were considered to be outside the realm of philosophy proper. They moved into the newly emerging fields of anthropology, psychology, history, literature, and so forth. In the Cartesian Reformation sex complementarity

was overturned by sex unity and sex neutrality, while in the Aristotelian reformation sex complementarity had been overturned by sex polarity and sex neutrality.

In individual writers sex complementarity continued to emerge from time to time. Cavendish, Jung, Mill, Wolfe, Engels, in one way or another suggested grounds for the theory that man and woman were significantly different and that neither sex was superior in dignity and worth than the other. More recently, Edith Stein, Elsthain, Gilligan, Richards, Alcoff, Chervin, Gould, Wojtyla and others have sought to articulate this view in one range of human identity or another.

In earlier forms of sex complementarity there has often been a suspicion that the theory actually functioned as a hidden form of sex polarity. When human characteristics were divided according to sex, and the score tallied, it appeared that the characteristics assigned to man were more highly valued than those assigned to woman. In addition there was also an uneasiness that a fractional complementarity which described man as $1/2$ and woman as $1/2$ really held the hidden percentage that was more accurately reflected by the fractions man as $7/8$ and woman as $1/8$. For example the claim that discursive reason was man's proper range, and intuition woman's proper range would appear to imply that each sex provided $1/2$ of the range of reason to cooperative thinking. However, on closer examination a theorist would be seen to claim that only the lowest intuitive range was more present in women, and that a higher intuitive range which occurred after passing through discursive reason was also man's area of giftedness, so that the ensuing fractional complementarity really turned out to be $1/3$ for woman and $2/3$ for man. In this case fractional sex complementarity was actually just a different version of sex polarity.

These suspicions about fractional sex complementarity have created a situation in which it is important to articulate full and clear grounds for a new integral theory of complementarity. Certain historical developments in philosophy have occurred which now make it possible to achieve such a goal. Up until the nineteenth century the history of the philosophy of sex identity had been confined to a consideration first of man and woman as male and female, and second of man and woman in relation to masculine and feminine. While each of these foci are important as a component in any theory of sex identity, they do not provide the integral centre for a complete theory.

Specifically, until the development of existentialism in the 19th century there was no consideration of man and woman as self-defining human beings in relation to one another. Pico, the humanist who first described man as a self-defining being, opened the door to this way of thinking. However, it was not until philosophers such as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard who more fully articulated the need for a human being to define himself or herself, that the interiority of self definition as a crucial human activity was collectively recognized. In the same century Marx widened this range of self definition into political activity while Freud and Jung delved into its psychological depth.

Even at the risk of appearing to focus to much on the structure of a theory rather than on its content, it may be helpful to introduce a mathematical analogy to indicate the augmentation that occurred during these different historical developments in the philosophy of sex identity. In this model the philosophical starting focus of male or female could be represented as a point, the introduction of a scale of masculine and feminine could be represented as two further points which can be joined to form a two





dimensional triangle, and the introduction of man or woman as self defining individuals could be represented as a fourth vertex which connects to the other three to form a three dimensional tetrahedronal figure. With this last vertex of self definition, the human being, in its three dimensionality, develops his or her identity in relationship to the vertices of male, masculine, and feminine if he is a man, and to the vertices of female, masculine and feminine if she is a woman. By analogy with the tetrahedronal structure which stands as a minimum stable structure comparable to an integer, so also an individual self defining man or woman should be seen as an integral whole rather than as a fractional part when in relation with others.

When man as an individual or woman as an individual enters into the intensity of relationships with other men and/or women that lead to full personal growth qua man or qua woman, it can be said that they have leapt into a still further augmentation of their sexual identity. In the twentieth century, for the first time, philosophy has considered a difference between identity of man as individual and woman as individual and identity of man as person and woman as person. It is possible to depict the four levels of augmentation in the history of the philosophy of sex identity as follows:

600BC-
1400AD

male

female

1400-
18001800-
19001900-
1988

man as person in relation to woman as person
 in relation to man as person in relation to
 man as person in relation to man as person in relation to
 man as person in relation to woman as person

The introduction of self-definition as a crucial factor in human identity radically opened up the possibilities for a philosophy of integral sex complementarity. Man and woman, as human beings, equally have the capacities for self-definition, and both have different contexts for self-definition. In this way the equality and differentiation that are fundamental to sex complementarity finally can come to light. In the remainder of this paper, I will sketch out the way in which this interconnection between the capacity and context for self definition can provide a solid basis for a philosophy of integral sex complementarity by considering the traditional categories of sex identity in the following order: generation, wisdom, virtue, and opposites.

Generation

To begin with the category of generation it is evident from contemporary research on the genetic structure of the fetus that the mother and father provide an equal contribution to the child which has 46 chromosomes through their respective 23 chromosomes. It is also clear that the pathway of access of contribution of the chromosomes to the conception is different, for the male it is the sperm and the female the egg. Two eggs alone or two sperm alone will not result in fertile generation; there must be a difference in the pathway of access for fertile generation to occur. So prima facie from considering generation from this particular aspect there is some evidence for a theory of equality and differentiation present in man as male and woman as female.

On the other hand, a woman and man may also be considered from the perspective of what they have in common biologically. By virtue of their human nature they share many common features which are not shared with other kinds of animals, or other forms of life. Their organs, bones, genetic structure are of a common type. Generation is possible precisely because of this shared human nature, and the human being does not cross the human species with a different species. Therefore, in generation there must be a similarity with a difference for fertility to occur.

The classification of a human being as male or female usually involves a combination of the three main factors of chromosomes, hormones, and anatomy. At the moment of birth it is the anatomy that is informally used as criteria. However, different elements in society use different criteria as the determining factor. For example, the Olympic Committee determined that chromosomes would be the defining characteristic of a male or female athlete. In Canada and the United States the courts have selected the anatomy as the defining characteristic of legal man or woman to be used in the situation in which a medical operation has changed the anatomy of an individual from that of one sex to the other, or to clarify the anatomy as being more clearly identified with a specific sex when it is ambiguous from birth.

The problem of the question of the philosophical definition of sex identity as male human or female human does have some relation to the previously delineated theories of sex unity, polarity, and complementarity. Sex unity theories have tended to conclude from the contemporary fact that no one single defining characteristic of sex identity is universal, that sex identity is an accidental, rather than essential, characteristic of human beings. If the criterion that is suggested is chromosomes, they point to a 'legally defined

'woman' from a sex change operation who has the chromosomes of the opposite sex; if the criteria suggested is hormones, they point out that these are variable; if it is the anatomy, they argue that accidents or operations may eliminate that particular anatomical feature without changing the sex. For whatever characteristic is suggested, an exception is produced. Consequently, sex unity theorists conclude that woman or man can simply not be defined. In some poststructuralist writing it is even suggested that man and woman are 'dead' as fruitful concepts in western thought, and the job of the philosopher becomes one of destroying what remnants of the concept of man or of woman that remain.

Sex polarity theorists, on the other hand, as previously pointed out tend to take a single defining characteristic such as hormones, anatomy, or chromosomes as absolute, and then differentiate man and woman by virtue of this essential difference. They argue that a 'real man' or a 'real woman' have x, y and/or z. Other, less fortunate exceptions to the rule, are not really male or female even though convention or law might state that they are.

Sometimes an individual has an essentialist view of sex identity in his or her own situation which is revealed when through disease, accident, or aging the anatomy or hormones which have been central to their sex identity is changed. The loss of breasts, menstruation, testicles, and so forth is experienced as a loss of sex identity. The individual may feel that she or he is not really a woman or man. It becomes an important challenge for them to come to the realization that the lost aspect of their identity, while central, was nevertheless not essential.

Most debates in philosophy vacillate between these two extremes of whether sex distinguishing characteristics are universal and necessary or

accidental and inessential. It would seem that sex complementarity could develop a third alternative between these two extremes by considering how a theory of sex identity can spring from a cluster concept of male or female which included reference to a cluster of characteristics while remaining open to the possibility in certain exceptional situations one of the elements in the cluster may be missing. In this way the cluster, rather than the individual characteristic, is viewed as essential to sex identity. So nearly all men have male chromosomes, anatomy, and dominance of particular hormones, and nearly all women have female chromosomes, anatomy, and dominance of particular hormones while in a particular case which results from operations, accidents, disease, or birth defects one of these may be missing. In this way the exception does not destroy the cluster in the way in which it destroyed the claims of universality. In the cluster concept of man and woman, the exceptions are given their rightful place at the edge of the concept instead of at its centre. Sex complementarity retains a balance between the two extremes of essentialism and accidentalism that are the core to the respective theories of sex polarity and sex unity.

Wisdom

Moving to the second category or wisdom, a similar kind of initial defence of sex complementarity can be given. Wisdom presupposes the capacity to think in a self-reflective way. It can be said that men and women alike have similar capacities for reflection; they can intuit sense data, subject that data to discursive thought and reflection, and achieve intuitive insights that reach into new ranges of thought beyond simple reflection. There is an equality in the kinds of faculties of the mind in both sexes. At the same time

there is a significant difference in context of thought which is directly related to sex identity. It is in this range that the data for sexual differentiation appears.

The specific areas in which the data of consciousness may differ for a man and a woman have in the last two centuries become the subject of study.

Phenomenologists have introduced the notion of the lived experience of the body as being sexually differentiated, sociologists and psychologists considered the experience of one's recent history of being brought up as male or female as important to sexual identity, linguists have recently reflected on the impact of language on sex identity, and psychologists have considered the influence of inherited sexual images in archetypes, myths, and so forth on the formation of an individuated consciousness as man or as woman in a particular culture and in civilization in general. Historians have studied the significance of patriarchal structures of society and economists the significance of forms of production on the development of a sexual identity.

It is important to note that even though some aspects of consciousness can be identified as sexually differentiated, there are many other aspects of human consciousness that would be similar for members of both sexes. For example, women and men who share a common nationality, language, age, culture, profession, and so forth would have similar contents of consciousness within these shared areas. If wisdom involves at least partially a component of self knowledge, it would follow that the wise individual is one who is well aware of his or her unique and shared contents of consciousness. Therefore, being aware of sexually differentiated aspects of consciousness would be a part of the human experience of wisdom. It is a significant part, and therefore it needs to be included in a philosophy of human identity.

It is in this range of thinking about the self that significant choices can be made about ones' integration or rejection as man or woman of the characteristics that are considered as masculine or feminine in a particular culture. Once again it can be said that there are certain interesting tendencies among the three theories of sex identity in relation to this category of human existence. For example, historically sex polarity tends to encourage an essential identification of man with what is considered masculine in its traditional form with an accompanying encouragement of woman towards the masculine virtues as well. For example, a woman is encouraged to act 'manly' or with strength. In sex polarity, where woman is devalued as the inferior sex, there is no corresponding encouragement of man towards the feminine. In this case, the negative feminine is often identified with the derogatory 'effeminate'. Conversely, reverse sex polarity tends to identify an essential relation between woman and the feminine with an accompanying encouragement of man towards the feminine. For example, a man is encouraged to develop the virtue of 'womanly' sensitivity. It is also the case that in reverse sex polarity, where man is the devalued sex, there is no corresponding encouragement of women towards the masculine. Here the negative masculine is identified with the derogatory 'macho'. Whichever preference is dominant, for man or woman as the superior sex, the accompanying exaggerated preference for the masculine or feminine occurs, and which ever is considered inferior carries with it an exaggerated devaluation of the masculine or feminine.

Sex unity theorists, on the other hand, tend to disregard the relationship between masculinity and femininity and an individual man or woman. Today this view results in a desire to erase any historical consciousness of the relation between specific characteristics as masculine or feminine, and to move

towards an androgynous model of sex free characteristics. In theology, for example, this move results in referring to God as "It", rather than as Father or even Mother, as He or She.

Sex complementarity, in its integral form, claims that a man or woman who defines his or her identity can actively chose to develop a strong masculine and a strong feminine identity at the same time. In this way the continuum can move in both directions at the same time instead of moving towards an identification of either masculine or feminine as in sex polarity, or neither masculine or feminine as in sex unity. For sex complementarity one might say it is valuable to be both masculine and feminine within the context of the evaluation of the qualities that these characteristics delineate within a particular culture.

Margaret Mead has pointed out that different cultures identify different qualities with one or the other sex, so there do not appear to be any universal qualities that are considered masculine in all cultures or feminine in all cultures. The tendency for sex unity theorists is to conclude from this that all sex identified characteristics are arbitrarily identified as masculine or feminine; or for sex polarity theorists to argue that a particular characteristic ought to be identified with one or the other sex as universal. However, it seems that an approach that considers a cluster of qualities once again offers a third way, a creative domain in which the masculine and feminine can be considered in relation to the male and female cluster that was previously considered in the category of generation. What sort of characteristics spring from a woman's body in generation, in her lived experience of the body, in her socialization, and so forth? How do these contribute to her self definition as woman in a particular culture? A similar

analysis can be given for man. In this way it becomes part of the task of self definition to incorporate and develop various aspects of one's own sexual identity. The sexually differentiated cluster is the data that distinguishes man and woman, while the capacity to define oneself is equal for members of both sexes. These two factors of equality and differentiation provide the framework for sex complementarity. The fact that it is a complete and independent human being who is reflecting on his or her identity in the activity of self definition provides the basis for the integral, nature of the sex complementarity. It is a whole, and not a fractional, individual human being who is engaged in defining himself or herself as a man or woman precisely through reflection and choice in relation to his maleness, masculinity and femininity, and her femaleness, masculinity and femininity.

Virtue

In this third category of sex identity a prima facie defence can be given for sex complementarity in relation to the two fundamental concepts of equality and differentiation. Virtue presupposes action, and action presupposes a capacity to judge, to chose, to will, and to execute this choice. Men and women have equal capacities to act, to judge, to choose, to will, and to execute choices. However, the contexts in which this activity occurs is sometimes sexually differentiated.

In other words there may be times when the sex identity of an individual is significant to a particular choice. In the most basic sense it can be argued that there are certain areas in which a member of one sex can not enter into a range of ethical decisions and actions because the context is sexually delineated. In an area which some philosophers consider involve ethical

decisions, the sexual differentiation of the physical body determines the kinds of actions that can be performed. To give an obvious example, a man can not decide whether or not to have an abortion performed on his own body; and a woman can not decide whether or not to undergo sterilization through vasectomy on her own body. The sex specified body simply determines the context. This would be the most extreme kind of example of the way in which the context of virtuous action can be seen as sexually differentiated.

In other situations a decision and act can be considered virtuous or not in relation to a sexually differentiated historical context. For example, a man who holds back from assuming a position of leadership in a mixed group may be exercising the virtue of temperance or self control while a woman who puts herself forward for leadership in the same group may be exercising the virtue of courage if the group has an historical dynamic in which leadership was traditionally exercised by men. Inversely, a woman who holds back from a kind of activity which exercises responsibility for a particular area of the private domain may be exercising temperance or self-control and a man who moves into the same activity may be exercising courage when the activity had been traditionally exercised by women. The key point here is that the context of action can be significant in certain contexts in which a man and a woman make decisions about what he or she ought to do.

Once again when virtuous activity is examined from the perspective of the three main theories of sex identity a certain tendency emerges. Traditional sex polarity frequently claims that the contexts of activity ought to be essentially delineated by sex. For example, it would state that it was not virtuous for a woman to act in the public domain or not virtuous for a man to act in the private domain, or that speech was virtuous for a man and silence

for a woman, or that ruling was virtuous for a man and obedience for a woman. Conversely, sex unity theorists have argued that contexts of activity ought to have no reference at all to sex identity and that even if they had been delineated sexually in the past, that philosophers ought to work so that there would be no reference to sexual distinction in the future.

Sex complementarity claims that the activity of self definition and movement towards virtue demands a close connection with the particular context of action. In certain situations this would involve reference to sex identity. In many other situations it may have no reference to sex identity, but could focus on other dynamics of context, such as one's professional work, one's political situation, one's leisure time. In this sense sex complementarity would argue that the context of sex identity is sometimes significant in action, sex polarity would argue that it is always significant in action, and sex unity would argue that it is never significant in action. Virtuous action, as the most perfect form of action, would be emphasized in each theory accordingly. A virtuous individual within the model of sex complementarity would be one who had developed the capacity to judge when sexual identity was a relevant factor in the activity and when it was not, a virtuous individual within the sex polarity model would be one who conformed his or her actions always to the correct parameters of sex differentiation, and a virtuous individual within the sex unity model would be one who acted constantly to break down any reference to sex differentiation.

Opposites

At the beginning of this paper it was pointed out that the pre-Socratics initiated questioning about whether male and female were the opposite or the


same. In the context of the historical evaluation of the progress of reflection on sex identity it was also seen that there was an historical progression of interest in male/female, masculine/feminine, and man/woman. The latter category evolved into a theory that man defines himself as an individual through reflection and action in relation to his maleness and his masculinity and femininity; while a woman defines herself as an individual through reflection and action in relation to her femaleness and her masculinity and femininity. When this process is analyzed through the traditional categories of generation, wisdom, and virtue there is strong support for a theory of sex identity that includes reference to sexual differentiation and to equality. The following chart summarizes these views:

	<u>equality</u>	<u>differentiation</u>
<u>generation</u>	same number of chromosomes	different pathways of access in egg and sperm
<u>wisdom</u>	same capacities of reflection	some different data of consciousness
<u>virtue</u>	same capacities for action	some different contexts for action

In all three areas, then there is a basic way in which the sexual differentiation of man and woman can be considered as philosophically significant and in which their equality in dignity and worth can be supported. Therefore, this preliminary sketching out of categories of sex identity can be seen as lending support to a theory of integral sex complementarity.

If these components of the cluster concept of integral sex complementarity

are drawn in a way that emphasises visibly the different bands of sexually differentiated aspects of sex identity along with common aspects it would appear as follows:



In this way it is evident that the categories of generation, wisdom, and virtue, when examined from a contemporary perspective, offer the fundamental framework for a theory of integral sex complementarity.

When we consider the relationship between the category called 'opposites' and a variation called 'complements' it is important to reflect again on the shift that has occurred in the history of the concept of woman in relation to man since the nineteenth century. The new understanding of man or woman as self defining introduces a dynamic into human life that had not previously

been present. Opposites need to inhere in a subject, so male and female or masculine and feminine can be described as opposites when they inhere in a body, or psyche, or human behaviour, and so forth. However, when man as individual or woman as individual emerge in the context of self definition then they can not in themselves be considered opposite. They are the subjects that are in a mutual activity of self definition. It is in this context then that it is more appropriate to describe man and woman as complements.

It is interesting to reflect on subsequent twentieth century discoveries about complementarity. In 1922 Niels Bohr discovered the principle of the fundamental complementarity of the physical universe in the context of the study of light. This principle was summarized as the claim that two sets of mutually exclusive concepts are needed for an exhaustive description of a particular subject. In his context the wave and particle theory were both needed to explain light. By analogy it could be said that an exhaustive description of the human being demands the articulation of the two mutually exclusive concepts of man and woman.

A second discovery about complementarity was made by Lee Yang in 1957 in a study of beta decay. This discovery was described as the principle of parity which states that complementaries are not mirror images of one another. Once again analogically it can be said that men and women as complements are not mirror images of one another. The way in which a woman or a man defines herself or himself is unique and unrepeatable, and will never be simply a mirror image.

This analogical application of the principles of complementarity and parity in physics to the philosophy of sex identity leads into the final area of consideration in this paper. There was in the twentieth century a fourth leap

in the evolution of the philosophy of sex identity. The first three approaches have been identified as focusing on male/female, masculine/feminine, and man/ woman as individuals. The fourth is a new focus on man/woman as persons. This fourth has emerged from the more recent discovery that the preoccupation with self-definition qua individual was actually an activity of isolation from the group. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and even in a way deBeauvoir and Sartre describe self-definition as achieving an individuality as man or as woman. It has now been realized that there is a further development that can occur, a development into man and woman as person.

One of the crucial differences between identity as individual and identity as person is the dynamic of interrelationship. One becomes a person in relation with other persons in the building up of communities. Individuals can be members of collectives, but these groupings do not focus on the complexity of personal identity. Instead the goal is usually collective action on a single issue. Communities instead consider the value of the persons involved as persons, as a unique and unrepeatable man or as a unique and unrepeatable woman. Therefore in collective action of individuals the uniqueness of the person is subsumed under the goals of the group, while in communities of persons, there is a constant interaction of the person and the community so that neither is subsumed under the other. It is in this context of persons in community that integral sex complementarity can be lived out. It is through the constant interaction of truth and love that this heightened personal development can be achieved. Without this kind of interaction it is not possible to become woman as person or man as person in the full sense of the meaning of the word 'person'. Alone one can become an individual, defining

oneself away from stereotypes, or historically dominating situations. To become a person, one needs others who are engaged in a similar activity.

Integral Sex Complementarity provides the necessary philosophical framework for this twentieth century task. With the framework in place the participants need to be aware of two pressures for rupture within the model of integral sex complementarity. It is always vulnerable to sliding into sex unity when the emphasis is placed on equality, or into sex polarity when the emphasis is placed on differentiation. This means that the practice of integral sex complementarity as a way of life involves choosing to remain within a constant tension. In fact the entire question of sex identity has now moved into the range of choice. What kind of woman do I want to be or what kind of man do I want to be? Do I want to remain at the lowest level of my existence or to relate to others as simply male or female human beings; do I want to enter into a serious reflection on how masculinity and femininity in my own culture expresses itself; do I want to become individualized as man or woman by taking responsibility for defining my own identity; and do I want to work towards full human development in relation with others to become a person as man or a person as woman? These are the deep questions that a philosophy of sex identity offers today.

APPENDIX

Agrippa, Heinrich Cornelius. On the Superiority of Woman over Man (New York: American News Company, 1873) p. 7 and 9-10.

God, the author of all things, created mankind after his own image and likeness. He created them male and female...The only distinction between them is that of their bodily formation. In the mind there is no sex or difference---intellect, reason, speech, are the gifts of each. Each are created for the same end, immortality. But Woman is the Superior Being of the two. If we carefully examine the subject, we will find that the race of Woman is inexpressibly superior to the race of Man...Examine the Scriptures and see if the origin of Woman is not greater than that of Man...the order of perfection God has followed in the formation of one and the other has been to begin from the most noble of the last kind and finish by the most noble of the next kind. He created the incorruptible bodies, the Heavens, the Stars, the Elements, which notwithstanding incorruptibility suffer many changes. From the Elements He formed all bodies subject to corruption, beginning with the lowest and going on to the most perfect. Thus He formed the minerals, then vegetables, plants, trees, and everything that hath life. He afterwards created animals, beginning with reptiles, continuing by them that live in the water and in the air, and by quadrupeds. God ended His work by creating Man and Woman after His own likeness. He first made Man and finished in Woman His work, of which she is the perfection and ornament. After Woman His work was ended, she being the perfection of creation. In her He had centered His power and wisdom. She is the last of all His works that came from His hand!

Albert the Great, St.. Quæstiones Super de Animalibus in Opera Omnia (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vives, 1890-99) These passages are translated by Sr. Marie Therese Dougherty. Book VIII Question 3 and Book XV Question 8.

VIII,3: From which (it follows that) complete victory of the seed of the male over the material of the female is the cause for the fetus being made like the father. If moreover the strength of the seed dominates according to the requirements of the species, and does not dominate or surpass according to the requirements of the individual male, then its warmth is weak, and the cold moisture of the female overflows. If the material resisting the active force simply dominates,...then a female like the mother is produced. XV,8: The female is less fit for laws than the male. For the constitution of a female is more moist than a male, but it is characteristic of moisture to relapse easily and to hold firm poorly. For moisture is easily moved, and therefore women are inconstant and always seeking new things.

Alcoff, Linda. "Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory" in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1988, vol. 13, no. 3. (405-436) p. 421.

The feminist appropriation of post-structuralism has provided suggestive insights on the construction of female and male subjectivity and has issued a crucial warning against creating a feminism that reinvokes the mechanisms of oppressive power. Nonetheless, it limits feminism to the negative tactics of reaction and deconstruction and endangers the attack against classical liberalism by discrediting the notion of an epistemologically significant, specific subjectivity. What's a feminist to do? We cannot simply embrace the paradox. In order to avoid the serious disadvantages of cultural feminism and post-structuralism, feminism needs to transcend the dilemma by developing a third course, an alternative theory of the subject that avoids both essentialism and nominalism. This new alternative might share the post-structuralist insight that the category "woman" needs to be theorized through an exploration of the experience of subjectivity, as opposed to a description of current attributes, but it need not concede that such an exploration will necessarily result in a nominalist position on gender, or an erasure of it.

Aristotle. Parts of Animals (Loeb Edition, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1937) 728a 13-27.

A woman is as it were an infertile male; the female, in fact, is female on account of an inability of a sort, viz., it lacks the power to concoct semen out of the final state of nourishment...because of the coldness of its nature.

Aristotle. "Politics" in The Basic Works of Aristotle (McKeon, Editor, New York: Random House, 1941) 1260a 4-15.

Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we maintain to be different from that of the subject;---the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs;---the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.

Astell, Mary. An Essay in Defence of the Female Sex (London, 1696; reprinted in New York: Source Book Press, 1970) pp.32-3.

To proceed therefore if we be naturally defective, the Defect must be either in Soul or Body. In the Soul it can't be, if what I have hear'd some learned Men maintain, be true, that all Souls are equal, and alike, and that consequently there is no such distinction, as Male and Female Souls...Neither can it be in the Body, (if I may credit the Report of learned Physicians) for there is no difference in the Organizations of those Parts, which have any relation to, or influence over the Minds.

Augustine, St.. The City of God Against the Pagans (Cambridge, Mass.: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1966) XII, 17.

There are some who think that in the resurrection all will be men, and that women will lose their sex...For myself, I think that those others are more sensible who have no doubt that both sexes will remain in the resurrection...In the resurrection, the blemishes of the body will be gone, but the nature of the body will remain. And certainly, a woman's sex is her nature and no blemish; only in the resurrection there will be no conception or child-bearing associated with her nature.

Boccaccio, Giovanni. The Decameron (New York: A Mentor Book, 1982) p.3.

Therefore, I wish to make up in part for the wrong done by Fortune, who is less generous with her support where there is less strength, as we witness in the case of our delicate ladies. As support and diversion for those ladies in love (to those others who are not I leave the needle, spindle, and wool winder), I intend to tell one hundred stories, or fables, or parables, or histories, or whatever you wish to call them, as they were told in ten days (as will become quite evident) by a worthy group of seven ladies and three young men who come together during the time of the plague (which just recently took so many lives), and I shall also include several songs sung for their delight by these same ladies.

Castiglione, Baldesar. The Book of the Courtier (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1959) pp. 18 and 205.

And the order of these was such that, as soon as anyone came into the presence of the Duchess, he would take a seat in a circle wherever he pleased or where chance would have it; and so seated, all were arranged alternately, a man, then a woman, as long as there were women (for almost always the number of men was the larger); then, the company was governed as it pleased the Duchess, who most of the time left this charge to Signora Emilia.

Chervin, Ronda. Feminine, Free, and Faithful (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986) pp 43-4 and 50.

Philosophical thinking about the feminine is rarely considered without the masculine. Throughout history and across cultures many philosophers have pronounced some form of complementarity. Generally they agree that there are intrinsic physical, emotional and intellectual differences between men and women and that these differences make men and women complementary pairs...A distinction should also be made between complementarity of qualities and complementarity of roles...It is my conviction that quality-complementarity contains precious truths and that role-complementarity, while sometimes too rigid, is basically helpful to women and men.

Daly, Mary. Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984) pp. xii and 409.

Recognizing that deep damage has been inflicted upon consciousness under phallogracy's myths and institutions, we continue to Name patriarchy as the perverted paradigm and source of other social evils. Our Naming/analysis becomes ever more direct and urgent as we confront the advanced stages of nuclearism, Nagging women to Realize our own biophilic reality...In her Self-transcending dimensions, each woman may be compared to angels, as described in medieval theology. In a real sense, she is, like the angels, a distinct species unto herself. An essential part of her project of Metamorphosis is the dis-covering of her own species, that is, Self-creation. For a Metamorphosing woman, the challenge is not one of uncovering some fixed genetic code. Rather, she must break the system/code of symbols that has been embedded in her psyche as a kind of pseudo-genetic code and that is intended to block her comprehension of her own species, her Self...This covered Code is, of course, Elemental.

deBeauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex (New York: Vintage Books, 1952) pp. xviii-xix and xxxiii-xxxiv.

Woman has ovaries, a uterus; these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature. It is often said that she thinks with her glands. Man superbly ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, such as the testicles, and that they secrete hormones. He thinks of his body as a direct and normal connection with the world, which he believes he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a prison, weighed down by everything peculiar to it...For him she is sex---absolute sex, no less. She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not

he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute---she is the Other...Now, what peculiarly signalizes the situation of woman is that she---a free and autonomous being like all human creatures---nevertheless finds herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other. They propose to stabilize her as object and to doom her to immanence since her transcendence is to be overshadowed and forever transcended by another ego which is essential and sovereign.

Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960) p.26.

I am therefore, to speak precisely, only a thinking being, that is to say, a mind, an understanding, or a reasoning being...I am not this assemblage of members which is called a human body.

Ebreo, Leone. "On Love and Desire: A dialogue between Philo and Sophia" in Renaissance Philosophy, Volume I: The Italian Philosophers (New York: Modern Library Edition, 1967) pp. 221-2.

Sophia: I wonder, rather, how it is that love can be admirable when it is not governed by reason and prudence?...

Philo: You have missed the point. Lack of restraint is not is not characteristic of wanton love but pertains, rather, to all great and noble loves---good or bad...

Sophia: And yet I would rather have your love governed by the reason from whence it sprang. Reason governs every person of worth.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) p.302 and 351.

This is what we need: we need an account of women's liberation which can incorporate the self-understanding of the female subject as an essential feature of its overall logic of explanation. We need to be able, cogently, to articulate the bases and steps in the creation of female identity, public and private...A richly complex private sphere requires, in order that it survive, freedom from some all-encompassing public imperative, but in order for it to flourish the public world itself must nurture and sustain a set of ethical imperatives, including a commitment to preserve, protect, and defend human beings in their capacities as private persons, and to allow men and women alike to partake in the good of the public sphere on an equal basis of participatory dignity and equality...My ideal is the preservation of a tension between diverse spheres and competing ideals and purposes.

Empedocles. "On Nature and Purifications" in Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorosokratiker. Edited by Kathleen Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956) Fragment 62, p. 59.

The substance of (the child's) limbs is divided (between them), part in the man's (body) and part in the woman's.

Engels, Frederick. The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (New York: International Publishers, 1972) pp. 128-9 and 144.

In an old unpublished manuscript written by Marx and myself in 1846, I find the words: "The first division of labor is that between man and woman for the propagation of children." And today I can add: The first class opposition that appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression coincides with that of the female sex by the male...Full freedom of marriage can therefore only be generally established with the abolition of capitalist production and of the property relations created by it has removed all the accompanying economic considerations which still exert such a powerful influence on the choice of a marriage partner. For then there is no other motive except mutual inclination.

Eyb, Albrecht von. Das Ehebuchlein (Whether A Man Should Marry or Not) in Deutsche Schriften, Vol I. Edited by Max Herman (Berlin: Weidmann, 1890) Translated by Robert Sullivan. pp. 4 and 73.

The natural masters posed and disputed a fine common question in their exercises and schools: Whether a man should marry or not. Although these same masters disposed of this question in a few words, I, Albrecht von Eyb, doctor of both laws, archdeacon of Wurzburg and cathedral canon of Bamberg and Eichstatt, have nevertheless decided to write about this question for the praiseworthy imperial city of Nuremberg...Who revealed to us the utility and use of writing, who was its inventor and teacher? Women. Isis, a woman not only invented the first letters in Egypt, but also discovered how to cultivate the earth, and the use of flax. Nicostrata, who is also called Clementis, invented Latin letters and taught how to put them together. Sapho wrote many books of poetry which the Greeks hold and preserve in honour on account of their special meaning, eloquence, and art. Cornelia composed and wrote many Latin letters and epistles which were still used after her death. Aspasia was such a highly educated and eloquent woman that Socrates was not ashamed to learn many skills from her.

Firestone, Shulamith. The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1972) pp. 238 and 244.

The freeing of women from the tyranny of their biology by any means available, and the diffusion of the childbearing and childrearing role to the society as a whole, to men and other children as well as women. This has been corrected. Childbearing could be taken over by technology...The ultimate Goal: full sexual freedom allowing attainment of "happiness". Disappearance of sex, age, and race distinction and of the psychology of power.

Freud, Sigmund. "Femininity" in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (London: Penguin Books, 1973) p. 163.

And we are now struck by a difference between the two sexes, which is probably momentous, in regard to the relation of the Oedipus complex to the castration complex. In a boy the Oedipus complex, in which he desires his mother and would like to get rid of his father as being a rival, develops naturally from the phase of his phallic sexuality. The thread to castration compels him, however to give up that attitude. Under the impression of the danger of losing his penis, the Oedipus complex is abandoned, repressed and, in the most normal cases, entirely destroyed, and a severe superego is set up as its heir. What happens with a girl is almost the opposite. The castration complex prepares for the Oedipus complex instead of destroying it; the girl is driven out of her attachment to her mother through the influence of her envy for the penis and she enters the Oedipus situation as though into a haven of refuge. In the absence of fear of castration the chief motive is lacking which leads boys to surmount the Oedipus complex. Girls remain in it for an indeterminate length of time; they demolish it late, and even so, incompletely. In these circumstances the formation of the super-ego must suffer; it cannot attain the strength and independence which give it its cultural significance, and feminists are not pleased when we point out to the effects of this factor upon the average feminine character.

Giles of Rome. De Formatione Corporis Humani in Utero in M. Anthony Hewson, Giles of Rome and the Medieval Theory of Conception (London: The Athlone Press, 1975) p. 183.

In the case of man, the male agent is disposed to generate a male, the generation of a female in any particular case being beyond the intention of the agent. For this reason woman is called an "imperfect man," a mas occasionatus.

Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's

Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982) p. 173.

My research suggests that men and women may speak different languages that they assume are the same, using similar words to encode disparate experiences of self and social relationships. Because these languages share an overlapping moral vocabulary, they contain a propensity for systematic mistranslation, creating misunderstandings which impede communication and limit the potential for cooperation and care in relationships. At the same time, however, these languages articulate with one another in critical ways. Just as the language of responsibilities provides a weblike imagery of relationships to replace a hierarchical ordering that dissolves with the coming of equality, so the language of rights underlines the importance of including in the network of care not only the other but also the self.

Gould, Carol C.. "The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of Philosophy" in Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky, eds. (New York: Perigee Books, 1976) pp. 6-7.

Feminists have taken the woman question to be a philosophical question in two very different ways. The first approach addresses the problem of universality in the following way: since women, like men, are persons or human beings, they have all and only those rights which apply universally to humans qua human...Other feminists have argued that the sexual polarity establishes fundamental categories of human nature, and that therefore there is no common universal human nature, but only male nature and female nature. This view implies that "woman" is a fundamental philosophical notion, insofar as it establishes sex difference as essential or categorical. My position is distinct from both of these. Although I want to hold that the question of women is philosophical (as on the second view), this does not commit me to the claim that the differences between men and women are fundamental differences of natures. Instead, while arguing that the question of women is philosophical, I also want to claim (as on the first view), that the oppression of women as well as all significant differences between men and women are thoroughly historical, social and cultural. Now I can maintain these seemingly incompatible positions at the same time because I would claim that social, cultural and historical differences can be relevant philosophical differences. Or to put it differently, that being human is essentially a social, historical and cultural matter, and that differences which are rooted in such contexts are therefore philosophically relevant differences.

Hegel, G. W. F.. The Phenomenology of Mind (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) pp. 476-7.

In a household of the ethical kind, a woman's relationships are not

based on a reference to this particular husband, this particular child, but to a husband, to children in general,---not to feeling, but to the universal. The distinction between her ethical life (while it determines her particular existence and brings her pleasure) and that of her husband consists just in this, that it has always a directly universal significance for her, and is quite alien to the impulsive condition of mere particular desire. On the other hand, in the husband these two aspects get separated; and since he possesses, as a citizen, the self-conscious power belonging to the universal life, the life of the social whole, he acquires thereby the rights of desire, and keeps himself at the same time in detachment from it. So far, then, as particularity is implicated in this relationship in the case of the wife, her ethical life is not purely ethical; so far, however, as it is ethical, the particularity is a matter of indifference, and the wife is without the moment of knowing herself as this particular self in and through an other.

Hildegard of Bingen. Heilkunde: Das Buch von dem inneren Wesen der verschiedenen NATUREN in der Schöpfung (Causae et Curae) (Salzburg: Otto Muller Verlag, 1972) p. 140. Translated by Jasmin El-Kordi Schmidt.

[In Hildegard's typology four kinds of men and four kinds of women are differentiated depending upon the varying amount of the 'male' elements of fire and earth, 'female' elements of air and water, and the humours. In the following passage she describes the 'best' kind of man in the context of sexual intercourse and celibacy. "The addition of wind in their genitals moderates and tames the fiery power within themselves...That is why one refers to them as a golden ediface of sexual embrace...With women they can have an honorable and fruitful relationship. The eyes of such men can meet squarely with those of the women, much in contrast to those other men's eyes that were fixed on them like arrows...Often they too must bear some pain when they try with all their strength to abstain; but they are so adroit, a wisdom that takes its beautiful self-control out of the female element; for they are in possession of a sensible understanding."]

Jaggar, Alison. "On Sex Equality" in Sex Equality, Jane English ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977, pp. 93-110.) pp. 108-9.

This account of sexual equality is obviously not purely analytic, nor is it intended to be. It is designed to persuade. And if it is accepted, various practical conclusions follow from it. If sexual equality requires integration, then a feminist should seek to modify our language by the use of neuter proper names and the elimination of gender in order to undermine the sexist consciousness which presently permeates it. They must, of course, continue the long and tedious

struggle against institutionalized sexual discrimination. And when people complain that you can't tell the boys from the girls nowadays, the feminist response must be to point out that it should make no difference. As Florynce Kennedy demanded, "Why do they want to know anyway? So that they can discriminate?"

Jung, C. G.. "Anima and Animus" in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology: The Collected Works of C.J. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) Volume 7, p.205 and 209.

In the course of my exposition so far, I have kept exclusively to masculine psychology. The anima, being of feminine gender, is exclusively a figure that compensates the masculine consciousness. In woman the compensating figure is of a masculine character, and can therefore appropriately be termed the animus...The animus is the deposit, as it were, of all woman's ancestral experiences of man---and not only that, he is also a creative and procreative being, not in the sense of masculine creativity, but in the sense that he brings forth something we might call the spermatic word. Just as a man brings forth his work as a complete creation out of his inner feminine nature, so the inner masculine side of a woman brings forth creative seeds which have the power to fertilize the feminine side of the man.

Kant, Immanuel. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965) pp. 78-81, 95.

The fair sex has just as much understanding as the male, but it is a beautiful understanding, whereas ours should be a deep understanding, an expression that signifies identity with the sublime...Deep meditation and long-sustained reflection are noble but difficult, and do not well befit a person in whom unconstrained charms should show nothing else than a beautiful nature. Laborious learning or painful pondering, even if a woman should greatly succeed in it, destroy the merits that are proper to her sex...Her philosophy is not to reason, but to sense. The philosophy of a woman is a beautiful virtue. That of the male sex should be a noble virtue...In matrimonial life the united pair should, as it were, constitute a single moral person, which is animated and governed by the understanding of the man and the taste of the wife.

Kierkegaard, Soren. Stages on Life's Way (New York: Schocken Books, 1967) pp. 61 and 162-3.

[The aesthetic Constantine states] And now for woman, the subject on which I would speak...She can only be rightly construed under the category of jest. It is man's part to be absolute, to act absolutely, to

give expression to the absolute; woman has her being in relationships. Between two such different beings no genuine reciprocal action can take place...Jest is not an aesthetic but an imperfect ethical category... [The ethical married man states] And now as to her---for (it is true of her also that) without a resolution there is no marriage. A feminine soul has not and should not have the sort of reflection man has. It is not in this wise therefore she is able to attain the resolution. But starting with aesthetic immediacy, with the swiftness of a bird she attains the religious...As a married couple both are on the common ground of religious immediacy. But man reaches this through an ethical development...One must remember that a woman in understanding is not a man in understanding. The loftiest understanding a woman possesses---possesses with honor and consistently with beauty---is religious immediacy...Woman because of her immediacy is essentially aesthetic, but just because she is essentially this, the transition to the religious is also direct.

Maimonides, Moses. The Medical Aphorisms of Maimonides (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 19--) pp.184-5.

One may hear the statement of Aristotle and his words in this matter (in the original) in the eighteenth treatise of his book "animalia" where he asserts: "The warmth that is found in the female is weak, although occasionally some people claim the opposite of this, namely that the blood in the female is more abundant than the male...They further think that blood in general has this same form, and it is sufficient for them that it is moist and has the appearance of blood. They do not know, however, that (women) have very little pure blood containing good chymes and that menstrual blood is not at all pure." This is the statement of Aristotle and it is the truth.

Marx, Karl. The Communist Manifesto (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954) pp. 47-9.

Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists...The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion, than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women. He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production. For the rest, it is self-evident, that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, i.e. of prostitution both public and private.

Mill, John Stuart. The Subjection of Women (Cambridge, Mass.:The MIT Press, 1972) p. 59 and 95.

Hardly anything can be of greater value to a man of theory and speculation who employs himself not in collecting materials of knowledge by observation, but in working them up by processes of thought into comprehensive truths of science and laws of conduct, than to carry on his speculations in the companionship, and under the criticism, or a really superior woman. There is nothing comparable to it for keeping his thoughts within the limits of real things, and the actual facts of nature. A woman seldom runs wild after an abstraction...Women's thoughts are thus as useful in giving reality to those of thinking men, as men's thoughts in giving width and largeness to those of women...What marriage may be in the case of two persons of cultivated faculties, identical in opinions and purposes, between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity of powers and capacities, with reciprocal superiority in them---so that each can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately the pleasure of leading and of being led in the path of development---I will not attempt to describe...But I maintain, with the profoundest conviction, that this, and this only, is the ideal of marriage.

Montagu, Ashley. The Natural Superiority of Women (New York: Collier Books, 1968) pp. 83 and 206-7.

The evidence is clear: from the constitutional standpoint woman is the stronger sex. The explanation of the greater constitutional strength of the female lies largely, if not entirely, in her possession of two complete x-chromosomes and the male's possession of only one...As we have seen in the preceding pages, the facts prove that woman is biologically the superior organism, superior in the sense of enjoying, by virtue of her biological traits, a higher survival value than the male. These facts should forever dispose of the myth of the female's physical inferiority to the male. Muscular strength should not be confused with constitutional strength. Constitutionally the female is the stronger sex. With respect to psychological and social qualities, the facts again, it seems to me, prove that women are superior to men. The proof here, too, is by the measure of our test of biological superiority, for women, by their greater loving kindness and humanity, tend to confer survival benefits upon all who come within their orbit more frequently than do men. Women are the bearers, the nurturers of life; men have more often tended to be the curtailers, the destroyers of life.

More, St. Thomas. "Letter to Mr. Gunnell from The School of Sir Thomas More" in Vives and The Renascence Education of Women (London: Edward Arnold, 1912) p. 177-9.

As I esteem learning which is joined with virtue more than all the treasures of kings; so what doth the fame of being a great scholar bring us, if it be severed from virtue other than a notorious and famous infamy, especially in a woman, whom men will be ready the more willingly to assail for their learning, because it is a hard matter, and argueth a reproach to the sluggishness of a man, who will not stick to lay the fault of their natural malice upon the quality of learning, supposing that their own unskilfulness by comparing it with the vices of those that are learned, shall be accounted for virtue: but if any woman on the contrary part (as I hope and wish by your instruction and teaching all mine will do) shall join many virtues of the mind with a little skill of learning, I shall account this more happiness than if they were able to attain to Croesus' wealth joined with the beauty of fair Helen...Neither is there any difference in harvest time, whether he was man or woman, that sowed first the corn; for both of them bear name of a reasonable creature equally, whose nature reason only doth distinguish from brute beasts, and there I do not see why learning in like manner may not equally agree with both sexes; for by it, reason is cultivated, and (as a field) sowed with the wholesome fruit of good precepts, it bringeth forth excellent fruit.

Mounier, Emmanuel. Personalism (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952), p. 109.

It is nevertheless true that our social world is one that man has made for men, and that the resources of feminine being are among those which humanity still largely neglects. How these resources are to be fully developed and drawn upon without imprisoning women in her functions; how to unite her with the world and the world with her; what new values and what new conditions this project calls for---these are questions and tasks inescapable for everyone who gives its full meaning to the affirmation that woman, also, is a person. (Note: See the special number of Esprit, June 1966; "La Femme aussi est une personne.")

Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of. The World's Olio (London, 1655) Preface

True it is, our Sex make great complaints, that men from their first Creation usurped a Supremacy to themselves, although we were made equal by Nature which Tyrannical Government they have kept ever since, so that we could never come to be free, but rather more and more enslaved...which Slavery hath so dejected our Spirits, as we are become so stupid, that Beasts are but a Degree below us and Men use us but a Degree above Beasts; whereas in nature we have as clear an understanding as Men, if we were bred in Schools to mature our Brains, and to manure our Understandings, that we might bring forth the Fruits of Knowledge. But to speak truth, Men have great Reason not to let us into their Governments, for there is great difference betwixt the

Masculine Brain and the Feminine, the Masculine strength and the Feminine; for could we choose out of the World two of the ablest Brain and strongest Body of each Sex, there would be great difference in the Understanding and Strength; for Nature hath made Mans Body more able to endure Labour, and Mans Brain more clear to understand and contrive than Woman's; and as great a difference there is between them, as there is between the longest and strongest Willow, compared to the strongest and largest Oak, though they are both Trees, yet the Willow is but a yielding Vegetable, not fit nor proper to build Houses and Ships, as the Oak, whose strength can grapple with the greatest Winds, and plough the Furrows in the Deep; it is true, the Willows may make fine Arbours and Bowers, winding and twisting its wreathy stalks about, to make a Shadow to eclips the Light; or as a light Shield to keep off the Sharp Arrows of the Sun, which cannot wound deep, because they fly before they touch the Earth.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Of Old and Young Women" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (New York: Penguin Books, 1966) pp. 91-92.

Everything about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: it is called pregnancy. For the woman, the man is a means: the end is always the child. But what is woman for the man? The true man wants two things: danger and play. For that reason he wants woman, as the most dangerous plaything. Man should be trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly...Let woman be a plaything, pure and fine like a precious stone illumined by the virtues of a world that does not yet exist. Let the flash of a star glitter in your love! Let your hope be: 'May I bear the Superman!'

Nogarola, Isotta. "De Pari Aut Impari Eva atque Adæ Peccato" (Concerning the Equality or Inequality of the Sin of Adam and Eve) in Isotta Nogarola Veronensis Opera Quæ Supersunt Omnia (Vienna: Apud Gerold et Socios, 1886) Vol II, pp. 195-6 and 206-7. Translated by Joseph Moller

Ludovicus: Every fault of Adam is also ascribed to Eve, because according to Aristotle the cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused: indeed every first cause has more influence on the effect than a second cause; for the beginning, as Aristotle again indicates, is said to be the greatest in any kind and is considered rather more than half of the whole. And in the Posterior Analytics: the thing on account of which anything is such a thing as it is, that thing is the greater. But it was on account of Eve that Adam sinned, therefore on that account Eve's sin was by far the greater...

Isotta: "Every fault of Adam is attributed to Eve, because by the authority of Aristotle whatever is a cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused." That is true in instances, as you well know, when things per se are causes of other things, which is right in reference to

the first cause, the first principle on account of which each thing is that which it is. You do not see this to have been true with Eve, because Adam either had free will or not; if he did have free will, then Eve forced him, which can not be done...The thing which forces must be above that which is forced; but Eve was inferior to Adam, therefore she was not the cause of sin.

Pisan, Christine de. The Book of the City of Ladies (New York: Persea Books, 1982) pp. 31-2.

God gives men strong and hardy bodies for coming and going as well as for speaking boldly. And for this reason, men with this nature learn the laws---and must do so---in order to keep the world under the rule of justice and, in case anyone does not wish to obey the statutes which have been ordained and established by reason of law, are required to make them obey with physical constraint and force of arms, a task which women could never accomplish. Nevertheless, though God has given women great understanding---and there are many such women---because of the integrity to which women are inclined, it would not be at all appropriate for them to go and appear so brazenly in the court like men, for there are enough men who do so. What would be accomplished by sending three men to lift a burden which two can carry easily? But if anyone maintained that women do not possess enough understanding to learn the laws, the opposite is obvious from the proof afforded by experience, which is manifest and has been manifested in many women---just as I will soon tell---who have been very great philosophers and have mastered fields far more complicated, subtle, and lofty than written laws and man-made institutions. Moreover, in case anyone says that women do not have a natural sense for politics and government, I will give you examples of several great women rulers who have lived in past times. And so that you will better know my truth, I will remind you of some women of your own time who remained widows and whose skill governing---both past and present---in all their affairs following the deaths of their husbands provides obvious demonstration that a woman with a mind is fit for all tasks.

Plato. "Laws" in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961) 804e.

And mind you, my law will apply in all respects to girls as much as to boys: the girls must be trained exactly like the boys.

Plato. "Republic" in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961) 454c.

If it appears that the male and the female sex have distinct qualifications for any arts or pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to each. But if it appears that they differ only in just this respect that the female bears and the male begets, we shall say that no proof has yet been produced that the woman differs from the man for our purposes, but we shall continue to think that our guardians and their wives ought to follow the same pursuits.

Porphyry. Porphyry the Philosopher to Marcella (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1987) p. 75.

For we have been enchain'd by nature's chains with which she has surrounded us: the belly, the genitals, the throat, the other bodily members, both in respect to our use and passionate pleasure in them and our fears about them. So then, if we should rise above their witchcraft and guard against their seductive snare, we have enchain'd what has enchain'd us. Therefore, do not be overly concerned about whether your body is male or female; do not regard yourself as a woman, Marcella, for I did not devote myself to you as such. Flee from every effeminate element of the soul as if you are clothed in a male body. For the most blessed offspring come from virginal soul and unmated Intelligence...Often people amputate some limb to save their lives; you should be prepared to amputate the whole body to save your soul.

Poullain de La Barre, Francois. The Woman as Good as the Man: or, The Equality of Both Sexes (London, 1677 republished Detroit: Wayne State Press, 1988) pp. 102-3.

It is easie to be Remark'd, That the Difference of Sexes, regards only the Body: there being no other, but that Part (properly) which serves for the Production of Men: And, the Spirit concurring no other way but by its Consent (which it lends to all after the same manner) we may conclude, That in it there is not Sex at all..It is God who unites the Soul to the Body of a Woman, as to that of a Man, and who joynes them by the same Lawes. The sentiments, the passions, and inclinations, make and entertain that Union; And the Spirit operating after the same manner in the one as well as the other, is there equally capable of the same things. This is yet more clear, when we consider onely the Head, the sole organe of Sciences, and where the soul exerciseth all its functions; the most exact Anatomy remarks to us no difference in this part between Men and Women, their brain is altogether like to ours: The impressions of sense are received, and muster themselves there in the same fashion, and are no otherwise preserved for Imagination, and Memory.

Richards, Janet Radcliffe. The Sceptical Feminist: A Philosophical Enquiry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) pp. 128-9.

So far we have made the sexes indeed sound equal in their differences, but it should perhaps be pointed out, since we are working against a background of widespread presumptions of female inferiority, that a good deal of female generosity is needed to count the situation as anything like one of equality. The sexes are indeed equal and different in their sexual need of each other: in ordinary relationships both are equally necessary. The same is true of their different functions in conception: sperm and ovum are equally necessary. However, only the female has the ability to carry, give birth to, and nurse the child once it is conceived, and this is an ability corresponding to which men have nothing at all. One of the principle differences between the sexes, in other words, is women's possessing an ability which men have not, and it would be closer to the truth to say that men were men in virtue of a lack of qualities, rather than that women were women on that account...If that sounds like female chauvinism, it at least be recognized as an appropriate reply to the male chauvinism of Aristotle, Aquinas and the like, who contrived by some feat of their highly sophisticated reasoning processes to overlook woman's rather striking extra ability, and see her whole essence as a series of inadequacies and absences, while at the same time transforming man's inability to bear children into a special aptitude for everything else.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Emile (London and Melbourne: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1974) pp.322-4.

In the union of the sexes each alike contributes to the common end, but in different ways. From this diversity springs the first difference which may be observed between man and woman in their moral relations. The man should be strong and active; the woman should be weak and passive; the one must have both the power and the will; it is enough that the other should offer little resistance...Thus the different constitution of the two sexes leads us to a third conclusion, that the stronger party seems to be master, but is as a matter of fact dependent upon the weaker, and that, not by any foolish custom of gallantry, nor yet by the magnanimity of the protector, but by an inexorable law of nature. For nature has endowed woman with a power of stimulating man's passions in excess of man's power of satisfying those passions, and has thus made him dependent on her goodwill, and compelled him in his turn to endeavour to please her, so that she may be willing to yield to his superior strength...The mutual duties of the two sexes are not, and cannot be, equally binding on both. Women do wrong to complain of the inequality of man-made laws; this inequality is not of man's making, or at any rate it is not the result of mere prejudice, but of reason. She to whom nature has entrusted the care of the children must hold herself responsible for them to their father.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1972) pp. 782-3.

The obscenity of the feminine sex is that of everything which "gapes open." It is an appeal to being as all holes are. In herself woman appeals to a strange flesh which is to transform her into a fullness of being by penetration and dissolution. Conversely woman senses her condition as an appeal precisely because she is "in the form of a hole."...We can see the importance which the elucidation of these immediate and concrete existential categories will assume for existential psychoanalysis. In this way we can apprehend the very general projects of human reality...If the slimy is indeed the symbol of a being in which the for-itself is swallowed up by the in-itself, what kind of a person am I if in encountering others, I love the slimy?

Schopenhauer, Arthur. "Of Women" in The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer (New York: Willey Book Company, n.d.) pp. 72,73, and 76.

You need only to look at the way in which she is formed, to see that woman is not meant to undergo great labor, whether of the mind or of the body. She pays the debt of life not by what she does, but by what she suffers, by the pains of childbearing and care for the child, and by submission to her husband...Women are directly fitted for acting as the nurses and teachers of our early childhood by the fact that they are themselves childish, frivolous and short-sighted; in a word, they are big children all their life long---a kind of intermediate stage between the child and the full-grown man, who is man in the strict sense of the word...For it is just because their reasoning power is weak that present circumstances have such a hold over them, and those concrete things, which lie directly before their eyes, exercise a power which is seldom countered to any extent by abstract principles of thought, by fixed rules of conduct, firm resolutions, or, in general, by consideration for the past and the future, or regard for what is absent and remote. Accordingly they possess the first and main elements that go to make a virtuous character, but they are deficient in those secondary qualities which are often a necessary instrument in the formation of it.

Schurman, Maria von. The Learned Maid; or, Whether a Maid may be a Scholar? A Logick Exercise (London, 1659) pp. 6-7.

A Maid may be a Scholar. For the confirmation whereof we bring these arguments: 1) on the part of the Subject...Whosoever naturally endow'd with the Principles, or powers of the principles of all Arts and Sciences, may be a student in all Arts and Sciences: But Maids are naturally endued with the Principles, etc. Therefore, etc. The Proposition is thus proved...The Assertion may be proved both from the property of the form of this Subject; or the rational soul: and from the

very acts and effects themselves. For it is manifest that Maids do actually learn any Arts and Sciences.

Smith, Hilda. Reason's Disciples: Seventeenth Century English Feminists (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982)

[This claim was made in a private conversation in Washington DC in 1980. It is possible that it has been modified since then. Smith's important work on the Cartesian Feminists emphasizes the role of reason in their struggle to overcome sex polarity traditions.]

Solanis, Valerie. "The SCUM (Society for Cutting Up Men) Manifesto" in Sisterhood is Powerful, Edited by Robin Morgan (New York: Random House, 1970) p.514.

It is now technically possible to reproduce without the aid of males (or, for that matter, females) and to produce only females. We must begin immediately to do so. The male is a biological accident: the Y (male) gene is an incomplete X (female) gene, that is, has an incomplete set of chromosomes. In other words, the male is an incomplete female, a walking abortion, aborted at the gene state...Being an incomplete female, the male spends his life attempting to complete himself, to become female.

Stein, Edith. Woman from The Collected Works of Edith Stein Volume Two (Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 1987) pp. 248-9 and 251.

I would like to emphasize only two criteria differentiating man from woman from those which are usually mentioned since they have particular significance in helping us understand the intrinsic value of woman. 1. Man appears more objective: it is natural for him to dedicate his faculties to a discipline (be it mathematics or technology, a trade or business management) and thereby to subject himself to the precepts of this discipline. Woman's attitude is personal; and this has several meanings: in one instance she is happily involved with her total being in what she does; then, she has particular interest for the living, concrete person, and, indeed, as much for her own personal life and personal affairs as for those of other persons. 2. Through submission to a discipline, man easily experiences a one-sided development. In woman, there lives a natural drive towards totality and self-containment...Both of these characteristic impulses as they emerge from nature do not demonstrate yet any initial value; indeed, they can be harmful. But, correctly handled, they can become most valuable...Because objective work, which we view as a remedy for the faults of feminine singularity, is something to which the average man is naturally inclined, it can thus be said as well that an allowance of masculine nature is the antidote

for the hyper-feminine nature. But with this, we in reality propose that, after all, the matter cannot rest there. It would be to attain thereby only an analogy to the masculine species, as, in fact, it frequently was in the beginning of the feminist movement; and that would be neither a greater gain for us or for others. We must advance further from the objective outlook to the proper personal one, which is also the attitude that is actually most highly objective.

Thomas Aquinas, St.. Summa Theologica (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) 1a,75,4.

For the active power in the seed of the male tends to produce something like itself, perfect in masculinity; but the procreation of a female is the result either of the debility of the active power, or some unsuitability of the material, or of some change affected by external influences, like the south wind, for example, which is damp, as we are told by Aristotle...Only as regards nature in the individual is the female something defective and "manqué," ...But with reference to nature in the species as a whole, the female is not something "manqué," but is according to the tendency of nature, and is directed to the work of creation.

Tiger, Lionel. Men in Groups (New York: Vintage Books, 1970) p.48 and 57-8.

It is basic to primate society that primates generally distinguish between males and females in interactions. This is obvious; but such a distinction must be significant both for the behaviour and social structure of any particular primate community and for the long-run evolution of selected genotypes of maleness and femaleness. After all, the estrous cycle determines sexual relationships, and there are clear modulations and shifts in the way adult males treat females in different phases of the reproductive cycle. This permits us to ask if, correspondingly, biologically linked mechanisms generally govern male-male interactions in the way male-female encounters depend in part upon such mechanisms...My proposition is that specializations for hunting widened the gap between the behaviour of males and females. It favored those "genetic packages" which arranged matters so that males hunted co-operatively in groups while females engaged in maternal and some gathering activity...The male-female link for reproductive purposes and the female-offspring link for nutritive and socializations purposes became "programmed" into the life-cycles of the creatures. It is suggested here that the male-male link for hunting purposes also became "programmed" to ensure equal non-randomness in the conduct of social relationships in this matter as in reproductive ones.

Vives, Johannes Ludovicus. "The Wife's Learning" or Chapter III of De Officio Mariti in Vives and the Renascence Education of Women (London: Edward

Arnold, 1912) p. 209.

A woman well brought up is fruitful and profitable unto her husband, for so shall his house be wisely governed, his children virtuously instructed, the affections less ensured and followed, so that they shall live in tranquillity and virtue. Nor thou shalt not have her as a servant, or as a companion of the prosperity and welfare only, but also as a most faithful secretary of thy cares and thoughts, and in doubtful matters a wise and hearty counsellor.

Wojtyla, Karol (Pope John Paul II). Original Unity of Man and Woman (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1981) p.79.

As Genesis 2:23 already shows, femininity finds itself, in a sense, in the presence of masculinity, while masculinity is confirmed through femininity. Precisely the function of sex, which is, in a sense, "a constituent part of the person" (not just "an attribute of the person"), proves how deeply man, with all his spiritual solitude, with the uniqueness, never to be repeated, of his person, is constituted by the body as "he" or "she".

Wollstonecraft, Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company ,1975) p.39.

I am aware that this argument would carry me further than it may be supposed I wish to go; but I follow truth, and, still adhering to my first position, I will allow that bodily strength seems to give man a natural superiority over woman; and this is the only solid basis on which the superiority of the sex can be built. But I still insist, that not only the virtue, but the knowledge of the two sexes should be the same in nature, if not in degree, and that women, considered not only as moral, but rational creatures, ought to endeavour to acquire human virtues (or perfections) by the same means as men, instead of being educated like a fanciful kind of half being---one of Rousseau's wild chimeras.

Woolf, Virginia. A Room of One's Own (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1957) pp. 101-2.

One has a profound, if irrational, instinct in favour of the theory that the union of man and woman makes for the greatest satisfaction, the most complete happiness...And I went on amateurishly to sketch a plan of the soul so that in each of us two powers preside, one male, one female; and in the man's brain, the man predominates over the woman, and in the woman's brain, the woman predominates over the man. The normal and comfortable state of being is that when the two live in harmony

together, spiritually cooperating. If one is a man, still the woman part of the brain must have effect; and a woman also must have intercourse with the man in her...It is when this fusion takes place that the mind is fully fertilised and uses all its faculties. Perhaps a mind that is purely masculine cannot create, any more than a mind that is purely feminine, I thought.